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WHEN THE CLASSROOM SPEAKS:
A PUBLIC UNIVERSITY'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO A RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS POLICY
Alfred B. Gordon*
The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange
of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues."
I. INTRODUCTION
The above quotation has become a guiding principle in higher education;
and accordingly, universities have crafted student bodies that reflect the array
of social, religious, racial, and economic constituents of contemporary
society.' To safeguard this basic tenet of education and its benefits in the
classroom, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 'Justice Lewis
Powell recognized the selection of a diverse student body as a "special concern
of the First Amendment."4 This recognition of a university's First Amendment
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law, 2000. 1 wish to
thank Professor Ann Massie for her helpful comments and enthusiastic support throughout the writing of
this article. I also wish to thank the Editorial Board of the Race and Ethnic Ancestry Law Journal for their
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1. Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N.H., 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967) (quoting United States
v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)).
2. See Roscoe J. Howard, Getting It Wrong: Hopwood v. Texas and Its Implicationv for Racial
Diversi y in Legal Education and Practice, 31 NEW ENG. L REV. 831, 838 (1997) (observing that after
Bakke universities redesigned their admissions policies to bring diversity to classroom).
3. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4. Regents of Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978) (Powell, J.) (recognizing First
Amendment protection of race-conscious admissions policies to achieve diverse student bodies). In Bakke,
the Supreme Court considered the validity of a medical school's admissions program that set aside a certain
number of seats solely for minority applicants. Id. at 272-76. According to Justice Powell's opinion, for
the court, the purpose of attaining a diverse student body was constitutionally permissible because of the
First Amendment rights of academic institutions. Id. at 311-12. However, the medical school's admissions
program violated the Constitution. Id. at 319-20. The reservation of a specified number of seats for
minority applicants was not the least restrictive means available to attain a diverse student body. Id. at 315-
16. The Supreme Court determined that a university must evaluate each applicant as an individual for all
the available seats. lad at 319-20. An admissions program that considered race as one factor among many
was an acceptable race-conscious program. Id. at 315-18. By considering race as a positive factor, the
school could account for race to achieve diversity and still not insulate the applicant from comparison with
all other applicants for admission. Id. at 317. Because the admission program did not compare all
applicants and consider all available factors to achieve a diverse student body, the Court held the program
unconstitutional. Id. at 320. See also U.S. CONST. amend. i. ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech... or the right of people peaceably to assemble...").
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interest assured constitutional protection for narrowly tailored race-conscious
admissions policies.5 For years, public universities across America have
instituted admissions policies modeled on this diversity rationale,6 and lower
courts have recognized that the First Amendment protects these policies.7
Nevertheless, ambiguity has replaced the once-settled First Amendment
protection granted such a consideration of race. 8 In 1996, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found the diversity rationale
unconstitutional, 9 and some states have outlawed race-conscious policies by
legislative means.' ° Many other states and courts, however, continue to
recognize the First Amendment protection enunciated in Bakke." As recently
as 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recognized the
5. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at271-72 (Powell, J.) (holding University of California School of Medicine's
admissions program unconstitutional but recognizing narrowly tailored consideration of race as
constitutional).
6. See Terrence J. Pell, Does 'Diversity' Justify Quotas? The Court Says No, WALL ST. J., Nov.
24, 1998. at A22 (reporting that diversity rationale "has guided the educational establishment ever since"
Bakke); Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 MICH. B.J.
1160, 1161 (1996) (noting that after Bakke universities revised race-conscious admissions policies to
conform with diversity rationale).
7. See generally Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (recognizing
diversity rationale as compelling state interest); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998)
(recognizing First Amendment protection of narrowly tailored race-conscious admissions policy);
McDonald v. Hogness, 598 P.2d 707 (Wash. 1979) (recognizing First Amendment right of university to
diverse student body).
8. See Steve France, Recess for Diversity?, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1999, at 30 (noting that affirmative
action and diversity rationale are under attack); Sedler, supra note 7, at 1162 (noting uncertain
constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies in circuits other than Fifth Circuit)..
9. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding race-conscious admissions policy
unconstitutional); See Sedler, supra note 7, at 1162 (acknowledging that Hopwood may "spark a spate of
constitutional challenges to racially preferential admissions programs").
10. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a) (1999) ("The state shall not... grant preferential treatment, to
any individual or group on the basis of race.., in the operation of... public education."); WASH. REV.
CODE § 49.60.400(1) (Supp. 2000) (same). See also Gilda R. Williams, Key Words for Equality, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1999, at 64 (discussing Washington's Initiative 200 that prohibits state-sponsored affirmative action);
John H. Bunzel, The Nation Post-Proposition 209, the Question Remains: What Role for Race?, LA.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996, at M2 (commenting on effects of California's passage of Proposition 209 that outlaws
government sponsored affirmative action); Kenneth J. Cooper, Fla. Regents Back Plan to End Affirmative
Action, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2000, at A12 (discussing decision by Florida Board of Regents to eliminate
consideration of race in admissions decisions).
11. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1999) (assuming
that diversity remains compelling governmental interest in realm of public education); Tuttle v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 703-07 (4th Cir. 1999) (analyzing race-conscious policy under diversity
rationale); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 808 (1st Cir. 1998) (following Bakke's diversity rationale);
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678 n.15 (3d Cir. 1993) (observing that Supreme Court
recognized university's academic freedom as aspect of First Amendment); Villanueva v. Wellsley College,
930 F.2d 124, 129 (1st. Cir. 1991) (observing that intrusion upon academic freedom threatens diversity of
thought, speech, teaching, and research essential to educational mission of college); Davis v. Halper, 768
F. Supp. 968, 975-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (acknowledging First Amendment right of academic institutions to
achieve diverse student body); United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1409 (W.D. Va. 1991)
(deferring to university's decision-making because of First Amendment right to academic freedom), vacated
on other grounds by 972 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
When the Classroom Speaks
First Amendment interest implicated by the consideration of race to achieve
a diverse student body.'
2
This Article argues that the First Amendment continues to protect a public
university's narrow consideration of race when that consideration contributes
to diversity in the classroom. In finding otherwise, the Fifth Circuit
mistakenly relied on employment discrimination jurisprudence. 3
Nevertheless, education and academic freedom represent a unique context to
which First Amendment protection extends.' 4 Because a racially diverse
student body contributes to a classroom's speech, the limited consideration of
race in admissions decisions remains a First Amendment interest of academic
freedom.'"
II. THE BAKKE DECISION
In an effort to ensure the admission of racial minorities, the Medical
School of the University of California at Davis utilized an admissions program
that reserved sixteen out of 100 seats for racial minorities.' 6 Allan Bakke, a
white applicant, applied for admission to the medical school in 1973 and
1974.' 7 In both years, the medical school denied his applications even though
it admitted minority applicants with grade point averages and MCAT scores
significantly lower than Bakke's scores.' 8 Bakke filed suit, claiming that the
medical school's race-conscious admissions policy violated his rights under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 The California
Supreme Court declared the program unlawful, prohibited the consideration
of race in admissions decisions, and ordered the admission of Bakke to the
medical school. 20 The medical school appealed the case to the United States
Supreme Court.2'
12. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 808 (1 st Cir. 1998) (refusing to reject Bakke's diversity
rationale).
13. See infra Part V.B.
14. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 798.
15. See infra Part V.C.
16. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272-75 (1978) (Powell, J.) (describing
medical school's admissions program).
17. See id. at 276 (Powell, J.) (describing Bakke's credentials).
18. See id. at 276-78 (Powell, J.) (noting discrepancy between Bakke's scores and scores of accepted
minority applicants).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 ("No State Shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."); see Bakke, 438 U.S at 277-78 (Powell, J.) (explaining grounds for
Bakke's lawsuit).
20. See 438 U.S. at 280-81 (Powell, J.) (explaining California Supreme Court's disposition of case).
21. See id. at 280-81 (Powell, J.) (discussing Supreme Court's grant of certiorari).
2000]
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The Supreme Court did not issue a majority opinion in Bakke. Four
Justices found that the medical school's admissions policy was constitutional.22
Four other Justices found that federal statutes prohibited the admissions policy
and that it was unnecessary to determine whether such a consideration of race
was constitutional.23 Justice Powell, announcing the judgment of the Court,
established a position between the extremes and found that some race-
conscious admissions policies are constitutional, 24  but that the medical
school's admissions program was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly
tailored to achieve a diverse student body. 25 Though no other Justice
concurred with Justice Powell's entire opinion, five Justices of the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of race-conscious
admissions policies. 6
In his opinion, Justice Powell examined the history of the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence 27 and found that all racial classifications are subject
to strict scrutiny.28 Strict scrutiny requires the governmental actor to assert a
compelling state interest for the racial classification and to demonstrate the use
of a means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.29 Because the medical
school based part of its admissions policy on race, it needed to show that the
classification served a compelling purpose and that the classification was
narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose. °
22. See id. at 325-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that "government
may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group").
23. See id. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (finding that
use of race as admissions factor was not before Court).
24. See id. at 310-14 (Powell, J.) (recognizing race-conscious admissions policy as constitutional
when used to achieve diverse student body).
25. See id. at 315-20 (Powell, J.) (finding medical school's admissions policy unconstitutional
because not narrowly tailored).
26. See id. at 325-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (observing that "five votes revers[e] the
judgment below insofar as it prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious programs in the
future"); see also Benjamin L Hooks, Affirmative Action: A Needed Remedy, 21 Ga. L Rev. 1043, 1044
n.5 (1987) (noting that Justice Powell's diversity rationale "together with the Brennan group's finding that
Davis' special admissions program did not violate the Constitution, showed the Court's willingness to
consider race as a factor in admissions decisions").
27. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288-95 (Powell, J.) (discussing expansion of Equal Protection Clause's
application from solely African-Americans to other minorities).
28. See id. at 291 (Powell, J.) (establishing strict scrutiny as appropriate standard of review for racial
classifications).
29. See id. at 291-300 (Powell, J.) (explaining strict scrutiny review of racial classifications).
30. See id. at 305 (Powell, J.) (setting forth strict scrutiny standard that medical school must meet
to sustain its race-conscious admissions policy). The medical school advanced four purposes to justify the
classification: (1) to increase the number of minority students, (2) to counter societal discrimination, (3)
to increase the number of doctors willing to serve minority communities, and (4) to achieve an ethnically
diverse student body. Id. at 306. Justice Powell found the first three reasons unconstitutional. id. at 307- 10.
However, he found that the attainment of a diverse student body was a compelling governmental interest
in support of a racial classification. Id. at 311-15.
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Justice Powell found that the attainment of a diverse student body
constituted a compelling interest served by a race-conscious admissions
policy. 3' In so doing, he recognized the selection of a student body as an
essential part of a university's freedom to make educational decisions, 32 and
stated that "[alcademic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment. '33  Relying on prior Supreme Court decisions, Justice Powell
found that the medical school advanced a countervailing constitutional right
of academic freedom in response to Bakke's equal protection claim.
34
Nevertheless, to satisfy strict scrutiny, the Equal Protection Clause required
that the Davis admissions policy consider numerous individual characteristics
in addition to race.35
Justice Powell found the medical school's admissions program
unconstitutional because it set aside a predetermined number of seats for racial
minorities and because it used race as the sole factor to achieve diversity.3
The medical school's ethnic set-aside system failed to achieve genuine
diversity because the policy did not consider the individual characteristics,
other than race, that applicants offered the student body.37 In contrast to the
medical school's overly broad policy, Justice Powell cited the Harvard
admissions plan as an alternative to reserving a fixed number of seats for
minority applicants. 3' The Harvard Plan considered ethnic background as a
"plus" for an applicant in its admissions decisions.39 The "plus" factor
31. See id. at 312-14 (Powell, J.) (recognizing achievement of diverse student body to be compelling
governmental interest).
32. See id. (Powell, J.) (noting four essential freedoms of academic freedom). In Bakke, Justice
Powell stated that:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four
essential freedoms" of a university- to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
Id. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(emphasis added)).
33. Id. at 312 (Powell, J.).
34. See id. at 312-14 (Powell, J.) (recognizing that graduate schools possess interest in diverse
student bodies); see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)
(discussing advantages that diverse perspectives bring to classroom and First Amendment protection).
35. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314-15 (1978) (Powell, J.) (explaining need
to consider more factors than race alone to achieve genuinely diverse student body).
36. See id. at 315-17 (Powell, J.) (disapproving of medical school's policy because it only considered
race).
37. See id. (Powell, J.) (explaining why medical school's policy was unconstitutional).
38. See id. at 316-17 (Powell, J.) (proposing Harvard Plan as example of narrowly tailored means
to achieve diversity in admissions).
39. See id. at 321-24 (Powell, J.) (discussing Harvard admissions plan). Justice Powell included the
following excerpt as an appendix to his opinion:
The belief that diversity adds an essential ingredient to the educational process has long been a
tenet of Harvard College .... In recent years Harvard College has expanded the concept of
Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L J. [Vol. 6:57
approach ensures that the university compares all applicants for all available
seats.' Under this plan, a university considers geographic diversity, athletic
ability, musical talent, and ethnic diversity to achieve a genuinely diverse
student body."' Justice Powell determined that admissions policies, such as the
Harvard Plan, are constitutional because they compare each applicant with all
other applicants as individuals.42
In Bakke, the Supreme Court's most direct statement on the validity of
race-conscious admissions policies,43 a majority of the Court found that an
appropriate consideration of race was constitutional." Moreover, in his oft-
cited opinion, Justice Powell announced that the attainment of a diverse
student body was a compelling governmental interest45 and that the
diversity to include students from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic groups. Harvard
College recruits not only Californians or Louisianans but also blacks and Chicanos and other
minority students....
In practice, this new definition of diversity has meant that race has been a factor in some
admission decisions .... [T]he race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor just as
geographic origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the balance in other candidates' cases....
The quality of the educational experience of all the students in Harvard College depends in part
on these differences in the background and outlook that students bring with them.
Id. at 322-23.
The amicus brief filed by Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University, and the
University of Pennsylvania was the original source of this excerpt. Id. at 321 n.55.
40. See id. at 317-18 (Powell, J.) (expressing support for "plus" factor approach to consider race in
admissions decisions).
41. See id. at 317-18 (Powell, J.) (requiring consideration of numerous factors to achieve genuine
diversity).
42. See id. at 318 (Powell, J.) (observing that university should compare each applicant with all other
applicants for admission). In Bakke, Justice Powell stated:
The applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a 'plus' on
the basis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat
simply because he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It would mean only that
his combined qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not
outweigh those of the other applicant. His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and
competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. See also Sedler, supra note 7, at 1162 (explaining that universities across country are adopting "whole
person" approach to admissions that weighs all circumstances of applicant's life with applicant's grades and
test scores).
43. See Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1839, 1863 (1996) (noting that
Bakke was only speech-related affirmative action case in university setting that Supreme Court has heard).
44. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 325-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part)
(noting that five votes upheld use of race in admissions decisions); see also DeRonde v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 625 P.2d 220, 222 (Cal. 198 1) (stating that in Bakke "a separate but clear majority of the high court
(namely, Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) indicated approval of race conscious
admissions programs"); 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 18.10, at 179 (3d ed. 1999) ("A program of admissions to an institution of higher education that allows
admissions officers to consider race as an affirmative factor without using clear racial preferences will be
held to violate neither the equal protection clause nor Title Vt because a different alignment of five justices
voted to uphold such programs.").
45. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-14 (Powell, J.) (finding that diversity rationale was compelling
justification for race-conscious admissions policy).
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consideration of race as a "plus" factor was a means narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.46 Hence, as a First Amendment right, the narrow consideration
of race to achieve a diverse student body is a constitutional exercise of a
university's academic freedom.
BI. THE FiRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS
POLICIES AS AN EXERCISE OFACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. Public Universities Possess a First Amendment Right to
Academic Freedom
A long tradition in American jurisprudence supports Justice Powell's
claim that public universities possess a First Amendment right to academic
freedom.47 Establishing this First Amendment interest in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire,48 Chief Justice Warren noted that an encroachment on academic
freedom would have a devastating impact on education in this country,49 and
46. See id. at 318 (Powell, J.) (stating that "plus" factor approach was narrowly tailored to achieve
diverse student body).
47. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A 'Special Concern of the First Amendment,' 99 YALE
LJ. 251, 311 (1989) (recognizing First Amendment right of academic freedom). Byrne argues that a
tradition of academic freedom arose from a history of autonomy for state universities and that the mere fact
that public funds supported a university did not relieve state authorities from affording public universities
academic freedom. Id. at 329. See also Robert A. Sedler, The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans on
'Racist Speech': The View from Without and Within, 53 U. PrrT. L REv. 631,679 (1992) (stating that First
Amendment protects "'the freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education' (quoting
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Powell, J.)); David M. Rabban, A Functional
Analysis of 'Individual' and ' Institutional' Academic Freedom Under tire First Amendment, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 227, 235-41 (discussing Supreme Court's early incorporation of
academic freedom into First Amendment).
In a recent law review article, Darlene Goring concludes that the First Amendment establishes a degree
of institutional autonomy for a university in which the government and courts may not interfere. See
Darlene C. Goring, Affirmative Action and the First Amendment: The Attainment of a Diverse Student Body
is a Permissible Exercise of Institutional Autonomy, 47 U. KAN. L REv. 591,653-54 (1999) ("Institutional
autonomy is a necessary component [to attain a diverse student body]."). Though the Supreme Court has
recognized that universities possesses a countervailing First Amendment right to diversify their student
bodies, the Court has not removed or shielded universities' race-based decision-making from intense judicial
scrutiny. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (Powell, J.) (requiring strict scrutiny of all racial classifications). But
cf Goring, at 63-54 ("Expansion of First Amendment guarantees of academic freedom ... will ensure that
educational institutions have the right to select a diversified student body without excessive judicial
scrutiny.").
48. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
49. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (emphasizing nation's need for
academic freedom). In Sweezy, the Supreme Court considered whether a state attorney general could
question a college professor about the political content of his lectures and his political views under the threat
of prosecution for contempt. Id. at 235, 238, 243-44. The New Hampshire Attorney General summoned
Sweezy to testify in an investigation under an anti-subversive activities statute. Id. at 236-37. Sweezy
refused to answer several questions concerning the content of one of his lectures and his knowledge of
various political parties. Id. at 242-44. The attorney general petitioned the court to find Sweezy in contempt
and to commit him to county jail. id. at 244-45. The Supreme Court found the statute's definition of
subversive persons and activities too vague and overbroad. Id. at 246-48. Moreover, the Court recognized
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Justice Frankfurter recognized that government must not intrude into a
university's fundamental academic decisions.50 Such fundamental decisions
include a university's choice of curriculum, selection of faculty, and admission
of students.5' Following Sweezy, several Supreme Court opinions echoed this
First Amendment protection of academic freedomi 2
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of New York, 5 the
Supreme Court again recognized that a university possesses a First
Amendment interest in academic freedom.54 Keyishian struck down New
York's statutory requirement mandating that faculty members of state
universities attest that they did not possess ties to the Communist Party.5 Four
faculty members refused to so attest; and in accordance with the statute, the
university threatened to terminate their employment.5 6 The Keyishian Court
recognized that the statute infringed upon the university's academic freedom
that the government should enter reluctantly areas of academic freedom and that the actions of the state
legislature and attorney general encroached upon Sweezy's academic freedom. Id. at 250. The Supreme
Court held that New Hampshire lacked the power to compel disclosures of the content of Sweezy's lecture
and political affiliations. Id. at 235.
50. See id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting four pillars of academic freedom as freedom
to choose faculty, curriculum, students, and methods). See also Rabban, supra note 48, at 256 (recognizing
that in Sweecy both Chief Justice Warren and Justice Frankfurter constitutionalized academic freedom by
tying First Amendment values to independence of universities).
51. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (recognizing aspects of academic
freedom).
52. See University of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990) ("This Court itself has cautioned
that 'judges ... asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision . . . should show great
respect for the faculty's professional judgment.' (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S.
214, 225 (1985))); Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 294 (1984)
(Marshall, J., concurring) ("[lin general, colleges and universities are most likely to fulfill their crucial roles
in our society if they are allowed to operate free of outside interference."); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312 (1978) (Powell, J.) (recognizing that academic freedom is special concern of First
Amendment). See also Rabban, supra note 48, at 266 ("Cases since Sweezy have reinforced without
significantly elaborating its indication that first amendment academic freedom applies to universities .....
53. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
54. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (stating that
academic freedom "is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom"). In Keyishian, the Supreme Court considered whether
employment at a state university conditioned upon compliance with a state plan to prevent the employment
of subversive individuals was constitutional. Id. at 591, 592. The defendants in this action were employees
of a state university, and each refused to sign the state-mandated certificate attesting that he was not a
communist. Id. at 591-92. Due to refusal to sign the certificate, one individual resigned, the school refused
to renew another individual's contract, and the university notified the other faculty members that the school
would not renew their current contracts. Id. at 592. The Supreme Court considered the subversive activities
statute, the progenitor of the certificate, too vague. Id. at 599-609. Moreover, the Court found that the
imprecision of the law was most offensive in that it encroached upon the academic freedom of the
individuals involved. Id. at 603-04. The Supreme Court invalidated the statute because it prohibited mere
membership in the Communist party without a showing of specific intent to further the unlawful aims of
the Communist party. Id. at 609-10.
55. See id. at 592, 609-10 (describing attestation provision at issue and Court's holding).
56. See id. at 592 (describing consequences to four individuals who refused to sign required
certificate).
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to determine the composition of its own faculty.57  Writing for the Court,
Justice Brennan observed that "[olur nation is deeply committed to
safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us ....
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment." 8
The Supreme Court also found that the First Amendment protects the
selection of a university's student body.59 In Regents of the University of
Michigan v. Ewing,60 a post-Bakke decision, the Court again recognized a
university's First Amendment right to academic freedom. 6' In Ewing, a
student challenged, on due process grounds, his dismissal from the University
of Michigan School of Medicine. 62 The Supreme Court found that the
university had met due process requirements and noted the First Amendment
interest implicated by the dismissal of students as an exercise of academic
freedom.63 In reaching its decision, the Ewing Court stated that "[a]cademic
freedom thrives ... on autonomous decision making by the academy itself."
As recently as 1990, in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,65 the Court
reiterated the constitutional protection of a university's academic freedom."
57. See id. at 601,603-04 (noting that statute created in terrorem mechanism in university).
58. See id. at 603 (recognizing constitutional protection of academic freedom).
59. See infra notes 62-65.
60. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
61. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (indicating that courts should
exercise restraint when addressing university's academic freedom). In Ewing, the Supreme Court
considered whether the University of Michigan denied a student due process when the university dismissed
the student after failing the first part of a national medical examination. Id. at 215-16. Prior to Ewing's
failure, the university allowed every medical student who failed the examination to retake it. Id. at 219. The
university denied Ewing this opportunity. Id. The Court recognized that the university followed fair
procedures in every respect. Id. at 224-25. The university gave careful deliberation and consideration to
Ewing's entire academic career. Id. at 225. The Supreme Court also recognized that the university's First
Amendment interest in academic freedom included decisions as to the admission and dismissal of students.
Id. at 225-26. The Supreme Court determined that the university afforded Ewing all the process that he was
due. Id. at 215.
62. See id at 215 (discussing dismissal of Ewing).
63. See id. at 225-26 (recognizing that academic freedom is "special concern of the First
Amendment").
64. Id. at 226 n.12.
65. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
66. See University of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 198 n.6 (1990) (observing that when
"government attempts to direct the content of speech at public educational institutions, complicated First
Amendment issues are presented because government is simultaneously both speaker and regulator"). In
University of Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court considered whether a university could withhold confidential
tenure evaluations from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under either a common
law privilege or as an academic freedom protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 184, 186. The university
denied tenure to a female professor who subsequently filed charges claiming that her superior sexually
harassed her. Id. at 185. The EEOC commenced an investigation and issued a subpoena seeking the
professor's tenure review file. Id. at 186. The university refused to provide the peer review material in the
file and claimed that a common-law privilege protected the integrity of the peer review process as central
to the functioning of colleges and universities. Id. at 186-89. The Court recognized that this peer review
process did not sufficiently promote important interests outweighing the need for probative evidence. Id.
at 189. The Court dismissed the university's academic freedom argument because the subpoenas were not
an attempt to direct the content of the university's speech. Id. at 197-99. The Supreme Court determined
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In University of Pennsylvania, the university withheld a tenure review file
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).67 The
university argued that tenure review was directly linked to the selection of
faculty and, therefore, that academic freedom prevented disclosure of tenure
review files.68 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, but recognized the
university's First Amendment right to select freely its faculty.
69
Lower federal courts and state courts also have recognized the First
Amendment's protection of academic freedom.70 In McDonald v. Hogness,7'
the Supreme Court of Washington addressed the University of Washington
School of Medicine's denial of admission to a nonminority applicant under a
race-conscious admissions policy. 72 The medical school's admissions policy
considered race as a "positive" factor in its admissions decisions.73  While
finding the medical school's admissions policy constitutional, the Washington
Supreme Court observed that the creation of a diverse student body implicated
First Amendment academic freedom.74 In reaching this conclusion, the
Washington Supreme Court accepted the First Amendment underpinnings of
academic freedom.
that the subpoena did not violate a common law privilege or the academic freedom of the university. Id. at
194-95, 201-02.
67. See id. at 186 (stating that University of Pennsylvania refused to provide tenure review files).
68. See id. at 196-97 (stating university's claim that academic freedom prevented disclosure of tenure
review file).
69. See id. at 197 (recognizing academic freedom to select faculty but finding right inapplicable to
case).
70. See supra note 12.
71. 598 P.2d 707 (Wash. 1979).
72. See McDonald v. Hogness, 598 P.2d 707, 709 (Wash. 1979) (addressing whether First
Amendment academic freedom protected race-conscious admissions policy). In McDonald, the Supreme
Court of Washington confronted the issue of whether a race-conscious admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 709. McDonald was a nonminority applicant denied
admission to the University of Washington School of Medicine. Id. at 709-1I. The medical school used
race as a positive factor in its admissions policy. Id. at 710. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in
Bakke, the Washington court ruled that this use of race did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and
recognized that the attainment of a diverse student body was a compelling state interest. Id. at 711-12, 715.
The medical school's admissions policy considered race as only one factor in its admissions decision;
therefore, it was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest in a diverse student body. Id. at 714-15.
The Washington Supreme Court held that the medical school's consideration of race did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 715.
73. See id. at 709-10 (explaining medical school's consideration of race as "plus" factor).
74. See id. at 712-13 ("We agree that in seeking diversity, the University of Washington medical
school must be viewed as 'seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance to the fulfillment of
its mission."' (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978)).
75. See id. at 712 (relying on First Amendment academic freedom to justify consideration of race
in admissions decisions).
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B. Academic Freedom Includes Admissions Decisions
As an exercise of academic freedom, a university may diversify its speech
through the composition of its student body.76 It was for this freedom that
Justice Powell recognized First Amendment protection.' However, his
observation was not novel. In Sweezy, Justice Frankfurter articulated the
university's parallel First Amendment rights to determine "who may be
admitted to study"78 and to determine "who may teach." 79  The Supreme
Court's treatment of these parallel rights demonstrates the First Amendment
protection afforded admissions decisions. 80
In University of Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court indicated that
attempting to influence a university's selection of faculty would impermissibly
infringe upon academic freedom because that action would direct the content
of the school's speech.8" Similarly, by restricting a university's process for
admitting students, the government infringes upon the content of the school's
speech as reflected in the composition of its student body.82 In Ewing, the
Supreme Court recognized that academic freedom included the right to choose
the members of a student body,83 and Justice Powell noted in his concurrence
that because of academic freedom, "Uludicial review of academic decisions,
including those with respect to the admission or dismissal of students, is rarely
appropriate."" These precedents demonstrate the Supreme Court's recognition
that academic freedom includes the composition of a university's student
body. 85
76. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 n.I I (1985) (noting academic
freedom applies to composition of university's student body).
77. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Powell, J.) (recognizing that
academic freedom includes admissions decisions).
78. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("It is the
business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedoms of a university - to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how is shall be taught, and
who may be admitted to study." (internal citation omitted)).
79. See Sweez-y, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing four pillars of academic
freedom).
80. See Rabban, supra note 48, at 266 (stating that fundamental academic decisions, including
admissions decisions, recognized by Justice Frankfurter in Sweecy "apparently have achieved doctrinal
status through repeated citation in subsequent opinions").
81. See University of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990) (distinguishing subpoena for tenure
evaluations from academic freedom cases and noting that Keyishian illustrated governmental attempt to alter
schools speech by substituting its employment criteria for university's criteria).
82. See id. (distinguishing academic freedom cases by government attempts to control or direct
content of school's speech); Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 n. 11 I 985) (noting that
academic freedom encompasses admission decisions).
83. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225-26 (discussing academic freedom to control composition of student
body).
84. See id. at 230 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
85. See University of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 192, 197(1990) (noting that faculty selection
implicated academic freedom); Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225 n. I I (indicating that university possessed broad
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C. Academic Freedom Includes Race-Conscious Admissions Policies
The consideration of race in an admissions policy is vital to a classroom
that reflects the many perspectives prevalent in society.86 By referring to the
classroom as the "marketplace of ideas," the Supreme Court has recognized a
university's First Amendment right to introduce students to various points of
view.87 In Keyishian, the Court recognized that by limiting which teachers had
access to the classroom, the state impermissibly infringed upon the academic
freedom of the university to introduce diverse perspectives to its students.88
Similarly, by limiting which students may compose an optimally diverse
student body, the state impermissibly restricts the exercise of academic
freedom.89 The refusal to allow a school to foster varying perspectives in the
classroom through a diverse student body reduces the breadth of knowledge
and understanding essential to the academic mind.9° Because a diverse student
body is important to a university's speech, the Supreme Court has recognized
that the First Amendment protects a race-conscious admissions policy.9'
Ultimately, the narrow consideration of race to achieve diversity in the
classroom compliments the educational mission of universities to reflect the
many perspectives prevalent in society. 92
Despite the First Amendment implications of academic freedom, any
consideration of race is subject to strict scrutiny and, therefore, must be
discretion in composition of its student body).
86. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L REV. 855, 862-63
(1995) (discussing fact that classroom presents rare opportunity to explore different cultures).
87. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The classroom
is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."'). See also Sedler, supra note 48, at 679 (stating that First
Amendment "permits [public universities] to affirmatively promote the values of equality and diversity in
[their] educational programs"').
88. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 607 (noting stifling effect from limiting association through faculty
composition).
89. See Hunter v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 971 F. Supp. 1316, 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (recognizing
that in context of experimental elementary school "the state's interest in maintaining academic freedom
offers significant support for the ... argument that the Court should afford deference to the necessity of
racial diversity") aff'd by 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999).
90. See Byrne, supra note 48, at 314-15 (discussing importance of different views in education).
Keyishian implies that many of the elements of diversity are important "because [they] express an invaluable
sense of what kind of society we, as a people, desire." Id. at 296. Byrne observed that diversity "serves the
academic values of humanism and democracy" and gives the student a perspective that "challeng[es] easy
ethnocentricity." Id. at 315.
91. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (Powell, J.) (recognizing First Amendment protection for race-
conscious admissions policies).
92. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) ("[A] law school ... cannot be effective in
isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who
has practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and
exchange of views with which the law is concerned.").
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narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.93 To satisfy strict scrutiny, a
university must consider the various characteristics that applicants will bring
to a classroom, not solely race or ethnicity, in developing a constitutional
admissions policy.94 This consideration of a variety of factors constitutes a
narrowly tailored means of achieving a diverse student body.95 In the decades
following Bakke, several Supreme Court Justices have reiterated that this
narrow consideration of race is within the ambit of First Amendment
protection.%
IV. BAKKE 'S DIVERSITY RATIONALE REMAINS A COMPELLING
STATE INTEREST
Since Bakke, the United States Courts of Appeals have disagreed on
whether diversity remains a compelling state interest.97 In 1996, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that post-Bakke Supreme Court decisions rejected the
diversity rationale and established a remedial purpose as the only constitutional
justification for a racial classification.9" However, in reaching this conclusion,
the Fifth Circuit relied on employment discrimination cases, rather than racial
classifications that implicate First Amendment academic freedom." Contrary
to the Fifth Circuit's finding, the First Circuit has refused to prohibit the
consideration of race when the consideration is narrowly tailored to achieve
a diverse student body.'t° Despite this differential treatment, Justice Powell's
93. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291, 299 (stating that racial distinctions are subject to strict scrutiny to
determine if those distinctions are precisely tailored to serve compelling governmental interest).
94. See id. at 316-19 (Powell, J.) (noting that admissions policy must consider factors other than race
to achieve diverse student body).
95. See id. at 318 (Powell, J.) (noting that competitive consideration of race makes race-conscious
policy narrowly tailored).
96. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A]
state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the
context of higher education."); id. at 306 (Marshall J., dissenting) (finding racial classification by school
board to achieve diversity satisfied "the demands of the Constitution"); id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(recognizing validity of diversity rationale).
97. See Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (4th Cir. 1999) (recognizing
disagreement among federal circuits on constitutional validity of diversity as compelling state interest for
race-conscious admissions policy). Compare Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 796 (ist Cir. 1998)
(analyzing admission policy's racial classification under assumption that diversity rationale was compelling
state interest) with Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945-48 (5th Cir. 1996) (determining that diversity
rationale was not compelling state interest).
98. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,944 (5th Cir. 1996) (asserting that remedying institutional
discrimination is only permissible justification for racial classifications).
99. See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995) (addressing racial
classification in awarding of construction contracts); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
477 (1989) (addressing racial set-aside in city construction contracts); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 269-70 (1985) (addressing protective preference for minority teachers in layoffs).
100. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1998) (assuming diversity rationale was
compelling interest to support race-conscious admissions policy).
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opinion in Bakke remains the clearest indication from the Supreme Court that
the narrow consideration of race to achieve a diverse student body is
constitutional. '0
A. The Hopwood Decision
In Hopwood v. Texas, o2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit found that educational diversity was not a compelling governmental
interest.° 3 The University of Texas School of Law's admissions policy treated
Mexican-Americans and African-Americans differently than other
applicants." The law school maintained two separate admissions files. and
two separate admissions committees to give minority applicants with lower
scores preference over nonminority applicants with higher scores. 05
Pursuant to its admissions policy, the law school denied admission to four
plaintiffs, who were nonminority applicants."°s The plaintiffs claimed that the
law school's admissions policy discriminated against them on the basis of race
101. See Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705 ("Although no other Justice joined the diversity portion of Powell's
concurrence, nothing in Bakke or subsequent Supreme Court decisions clearly forecloses the possibility that
diversity may be a compelling interest."); McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 938 F. Supp. 1001, 1014-15
(D. Mass. 1996) ("The strongest Supreme Court authority suggesting an affirmative answer [to whether
diversity is a compelling interest] remains Justice Powell's judgment-announcing opinion in Bakke.").
102. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
103. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits use of race-conscious admissions policies to achieve diverse student bodies). In Hopwood, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether the University of Texas School of
Law could prefer certain racial minorities in its admissions policy. Id. at 934. In making admissions
decisions, a separate minority subcommittee evaluated minority applicants who fell within the discretionary
zone of students for admission. Id. at 937. To maintain a pool of potentially acceptable minority applicants,
the law school maintained a separate waiting list for minority students. id. at 938. The plaintiffs were white
applicants who fell within the nonminority discretionary zone of admittance. Id. They filed suit alleging
that the law school's admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The court, applying strict
scrutiny, required the school to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored means
to justify the use of the racial classification. Id. at 940. The court concluded that the Supreme Court has
recognized only the use of race to remedy past institutional discrimination as a compelling governmental
interest. Id. at 944. Therefore, race-conscious admissions policies based upon diversity violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 945-48. In conclusion, the court rejected the justifications put forth by Texas
that the race-conscious admissions policy achieved a diverse student body, quelled a hostile environment
at the law school, improved the school's reputation, or eliminated past or present discrimination by actors
other than the law school. Id. at 962.
104. See id. at 936 (describing admissions policy that treated Mexican-Americans and African-
Americans in middle range of applications differently than nonminority applicants).
105. See id. at 936-37 (discussing University of Texas School of Law's admissions policy). First, the
law school's admissions policy allowed minority applicants with lower test scores to fall within the
presumptive or discretionary zones for admission, and the school evaluated applications for minority and
nonminority students separately. Id. A minority sub-committee recommended minority applicants in the
discretionary zone for admission, and the law school nearly always accepted the subcommittee's
recommendations. Id. at 937.
106. See id. at 938.
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and thereby denied them equal protection of the laws. 7 The district court
found that the law school provided two compelling governmental interests: (1)
achieving the benefits of a diverse student body and (2) compensating for past
discrimination.'0 In examining the second justification, the district court
looked at the past discrimination of the entire Texas higher educational system,
not just the past discrimination of the law school.'09 The district court found
that sufficient effects of past discrimination existed to justify the remedial use
of the racial classification. "0 However, the district court found that the law
school's differential treatment of test scores based on race did not consider
race as a "plus" factor to achieve a diverse student body."' Therefore, the
district court found the law school's admissions policy unconstitutional
because the separate minority admissions committee prevented the comparison
of minority and nonminority applicants during the admissions process."'
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the admissions policy under the
applicable strict scrutiny standard."' In the majority opinion, the Fifth Circuit
examined the constitutionality of the district court's two compelling interests
- diversity and remedying past discrimination."14  The court of appeals
recognized that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was the impetus for the
diversity rationale.' 15  Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the
consideration of race to achieve a diverse student body was not a compelling
governmental interest." 6 It based this decision on the assumption that only
Justice Powell supported the diversity rationale." 7 Moreover, relying on other
affirmative action decisions, the court of appeals assumed that the Supreme
Court had dismissed the diversity rationale since Bakke."i8
The Hopwood panel also considered the law school's interest in remedying
the past discrimination of the Texas system of higher education. " 9 The Fifth
Circuit found that the district court's analysis of the proper state actor was too
107. Seeid.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 938-39.
110. See id.
Ill. See id. (noting district court's finding that differences in treatment based on race were valid use
of "plus" factor).
112. See id. (noting district court's finding that admissions policy was unconstitutional because school
never compared all eligible applicants).
113. See id. at 940-41 (discussing strict scrutiny standard).
114. See id. at 941 (acknowledging district court's findings that diversity and remedying past
discrimination by Texas system of higher education were constitutional justifications for racial
classifications).
115. See id. (acknowledging that Justice Powell was original proponent of diversity rationale).
116. See id. at 934 (finding that consideration of race for diversity is unconstitutional).
117. See id. at 944 (dismissing diversity rationale).
118. See id. at 944-45 (discussing Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Bakke concerning racial
classifications).
119. See id. at 948-52 (discussing law school's asserted remedial justification).
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broad because it included all public colleges and universities in Texas.' 20 The
district court should have addressed the past discrimination of the law school,
specifically, not the Texas higher educational system generally.' 21  In
considering the law school's past discrimination, the court of appeals found a
lack of sufficient evidence of past discrimination to justify the racial
classification. 22 After rejecting the diversity interest and the remedial interest,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the University of Texas School of Law could
not consider race as a factor in its admissions policy because it lacked a
compelling state interest.2
Judge Wiener, who concurred in Hopwood, agreed that the admissions
policy was unconstitutional. 24 However, Judge Wiener disagreed with the
majority on the issue of diversity. 25 He found that diversity was a compelling
governmental interest for a public university. 26 He therefore counseled the
panel to take a narrower path and find the law school's admissions policy
unconstitutional for failing to be narrowly tailored in its legitimate pursuit of
a diverse student body.
27
Judge Wiener, commenting on the majority's dismissal of the diversity
rationale, argued that predicting the future law on racial classifications was
both unjustifiable and unnecessary to the disposition of the case. 28  Judge
Wiener stated three reasons for not following the majority's reasoning on the
invalidity of the diversity interest. 29 First, he found that it is the province of
the Supreme Court, not a circuit court panel, to declare the diversity rationale
of Bakke invalid. 30  Second, Judge Wiener observed that affirmative action
had survived recent challenges, especially in the context of diversity and a
university's admissions policy.'3 ' Third, he found it unnecessary to decide this
case on the legitimacy of the diversity rationale because the law school's
120. See id. at 950-51 (finding that remedying discrimination of all public education in Texas was
without necessary limit).
121. See id. at 951-52 (finding that past discrimination remedied had to be that of law school).
122. See id. at 952-55 (noting lack of evidence of past discrimination by law school).
123. See id. at 962 (holding that law school could not consider race as factor in admissions).
124. See id. at 962 (Wiener, J., concurring) (agreeing with majority that law school's admissions
policy was unconstitutional).
125. See id. (Wiener, J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority's ruling on diversity justification).
126. See id. (Wiener, J., concurring) (finding diversity could suffice as valid governmental interest
in admissions policy of public graduate school).
127. See id. (Wiener, J., concurring) (assuming arguendo that diversity is compelling governmental
interest and finding that law school's admissions process was not narrowly tailored).
128. See id. at 963 (Wiener, J., concurring) (noting that majority's position "remains an extension of
the law... [that] is both overly broad and unnecessary to the disposition of this case").
129. See id at 963-64 (Wiener, J., concurring).
130. See id. at 963 (Wiener, J., concurring) (noting that it is for Supreme Court to overrule Bakke, not
panel of circuit court).
131. See id. at 963-64 (Wiener, J., concurring) (stating that diversity rationale in context of public
graduate schools survived Supreme Court decisions limiting affirmative action).
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admissions program was not narrowly tailored.
32
In addition to Judge Wiener's observations, the majority opinion in
Hopwood misread post-Bakke cases as rejecting the First Amendment diversity
rationale in two other key respects. First, the majority concluded that Justice
Powell was the only vote in support of the diversity rationale.'33 However,
Justice Brennan's opinion implicitly accepted diversity as a constitutional
justification for the consideration of race in university admissions. 134 Second,
in a footnote, the Hopwood majority observed that universities are state
institutions and that the First Amendment "generally protects citizens from the
actions of government, not government from its citizens."'' 35 While the First
Amendment does protect citizens, it also protects some derivative institutions
of the state. 36 The academic freedom of a university is one instance in which
the First Amendment protects the rights of governmental institutions. 137 For
these reasons and those enunciated by Judge Wiener, courts and universities
should not rely on Hopwood as an accurate reading of the law on race-
conscious admissions policies. Moreover, since Bakke, several Supreme Court
Justices have recognized that the diversity rationale is a compelling state
interest138  and that the educational context is treated differently than
affirmative action in the workplace.
39
B. Post-Bakke Affirmative Action Cases
In reaching its conclusion in Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit rejected Justice
Powell's diversity rationale and relied instead on subsequent Supreme Court
132. See id. at 964 (Wiener, J., concurring) (noting that it was unnecessary to address validity of
diversity rationale).
133. See id. at944.
134. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326 n.l (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("We also agree with Mr. Justice Powell that a plan like the
'Harvard' plan... is constitutional under our approach."). The Brennan opinion in Bakke upheld the use
of race in an admissions policy on broader grounds than the diversity justification. Moreover, Justice
Brennan recognized the constitutionality of the Harvard plan, which embodied that rationale. Id. See also
Sedler, supra note 7, at 1161 (noting that Justice Brennan's opinion agreed with diversity rational and
constituted agreement of five justices that diversity was compelling governmental interest).
135. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 943 n.25.
136. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (finding that First
Amendment protects universities' academic freedom). See also Rabban, supra note 48, at 236, 268
(emphasizing that in context of public universities "the Supreme Court has observed, the state is the speaker
as well as the regulator" and that Supreme Court opinions "identified academic freedom as a distinctive right
within the first amendment and applied the concept to both individuals and institutions").
137. See Rabban, supra note 48, at 268 (describing First Amendment protection of universities'
academic freedom).
138. See supra note 98.
139. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (recognizing diversity in education as
compelling interest).
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affirmative action decisions.'" The cases involved public employment
programs that considered race as a factor in retaining or hiring certain
individuals or government contractors. 4 ' In each of the cases, the Supreme
Court recognized that a racial classification to remedy institutional
discrimination justified an incidental infringement on nonminorities' equal
protection rights.' However, the Hopwood panel misinterpreted this support
of the remedial justification as a statement that a remedial purpose was the
only legitimate governmental interest that could support a racial
classification.'43 The following section distinguishes these cases from the
context of education and the diversity rationale.
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company,'" the Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of Richmond's requirement that general
contractors who engage in work for the city subcontract at least thirty percent
of the dollar amount of each contract to minority businesses.""5 The city
invited bids on a project to install plumbing fixtures in the county jail.146 After
Richmond awarded Croson the contract, Croson was unable to secure a
minority-owned business to supply the fixtures and, therefore, was unable to
satisfy the subcontracting provision. 47  After the city re-bid the project,
Croson filed suit claiming that the subcontracting provision impermissibly
140. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 982, 944-45 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that Supreme Court
decisions on affirmative action dismissed diversity justification).
141. See infra notes 146-85 and accompanying text (discussing primary post-Bakke affirmative action
cases).
142. See id. (discussing remedial justification in post-Bakke affirmative action decisions).
143. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944, 949-52 (interpreting affirmative action cases to limit compelling
interest for racial classification to only remedying past institutional discrimination).
144. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
145. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1989) (addressing minority set-
aside program City of Richmond adopted concerning public contracting). In Croson, the Richmond City
Council required all prime contractors awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of
the contract's value to minority businesses. Id. at 477. After the adoption of this minority set-aside
contracting plan, the city invited bids on a project to install plumbing fixtures in the county jail. Id. at 481.
After being denied the contract, J.A. Croson filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the minority set-
aside program. Id. at 483. Addressing the city's authority to remedy past discrimination, the Court stated
that political subdivisions are not necessarily permitted to redress the effects of societal discrimination, even
though Congress has such power. Id. at 490. The Court concluded that the city could only remedy past
racial discrimination that the city itself had caused. Id. at 491-92. The Court reviewed the city's plan under
strict scrutiny. Id. at 493-94. The city asserted that its justification for the minority set-aside policy was to
remedy past discrimination in the construction industry. Id. at 498. The Court found that a general claim
of past discrimination in a specific industry does not justify a racial quota. Id. at 499. The Court held that
the city failed to show a compelling interest in using race to apportion public contracting opportunities. Id.
at 505. Societal discrimination alone was an insufficient justification and there was insufficient evidence
of discrimination in the construction industry. Id. The city did not seem to use any race-neutral means to
increase minority participation in the city's construction industry. Id. at 507. Moreover, the thirty-percent
quota did not seem to have any justification other than racial balancing. Id.
146. See id. at 481 (describing city's invitation for bids on plumbing contract).
147. See id. at 481-82 (explaining Croson's inability to subcontract with minority-owned business).
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discriminated on the basis of race. 48 Richmond claimed that the city required
the subcontracting provision to remedy past discrimination in the construction
industry as a whole, not merely past discrimination by the city.' 49 The Court
found that this broad remedial purpose did not justify the use of a racial
classification. 50 The majority opinion acknowledged that to justify a racial
classification on remedial grounds, the governmental unit involved must have
participated in the past discrimination.' 5
The majority in Hopwood relied on Croson as precedent for the Supreme
Court's rejection of the diversity rationale.'52 However, as Judge Wiener
stated in his Hopwood concurrence, Croson is inapplicable to race-conscious
admissions policies.'53 In Croson, Richmond asserted only a remedial
justification for its racial quota.'54  Therefore, Richmond's contracting
provision did not confront the Supreme Court with the diversity justification
and its First Amendment implications. Specifically, Croson concerned
minority quotas in government contracting,"' not minority preferences in a
university admissions program and the First Amendment right of academic
freedom.'56 In light of these fundamental differences between Croson and
Bakke, the Fifth Circuit extended its interpretation of Croson too far when it
concluded that the Supreme Court had rejected the diversity rationale.'57
Similarly, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,58 the Supreme Court
addressed a subcontracting provision in federal government contracts that
preferred minority businesses over nonminority businesses.5 9 In Adarand, the
148. See id. at 483 (stating Croson's claim that subcontracting provision violated Equal Protection
Clause).
149. See id. at 498 (finding that city's justification was to compensate for small number of minority
businesses participating in local construction industry due to past discrimination).
150. See id. at 499 (finding that remedying past societal discrimination did not justify racial
classification).
151. See id. at 499-500 (requiring showing that government caused past discrimination to remedy such
discrimination with consideration of race).
152. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945-48 (5th Cir. 1996) (interpreting Croson as rejecting
diversity justification).
153. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 964-65 (Wiener, J., concurring) (noting that post-Bakke affirmative
action cases did not dismiss diversity rationale as compelling governmental interest).
154. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 (stating city's remedial justification).
155. See id. at 477-78 (describing Richmond's race-based classification in awarding construction
contracts).
156. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449, 452-53 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(recognizing that defendants in Croson did not rely on diversity rationale) rev'd on other grounds by 197
F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999).
157. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962-64 & n.16 (Wiener, J., concurring) (finding that differences
between Croson and Bakke distinguish cases).
158. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
159. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995) (addressing federal
government practice of preferring minority-owned subcontractors). In Adarand, the Supreme Court
addressed the standard of review that a court should use to review the federal government's use of race
based presumptions. Id. at 204. In 1989, a subdivision of the United States Department of Transportation
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United States Department of Transportation awarded a highway construction
contract to Mountain Gravel & Construction Company (Mountain Gravel).' 1°
Thereafter, Mountain Gravel solicited bids from subcontractors to complete
the guardrail portion of the contract.' 6' Adarand Constructors (Adarand) sub-
mitted the low bid; and Gonzales Construction Company (Gonzales), a
minority-owned business, submitted a higher bid.'62 Federal law required the
prime contract to include a provision authorizing additional compensation to
a general contractor who subcontracted with socially or economically disad-
vantaged individuals. 63  The federal law presumed that minority individuals
were economically deprived for purposes of the subcontracting provision."'
Mountain Gravel awarded the guardrail contract to Gonzales because of the
subcontracting provision favoring minority-owned businesses.'65 Adarand
challenged the presumption favoring minorities as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.'6 The lower court upheld the presumption by applying an
intermediate scrutiny standard to the federal race-based action. 67  The
Supreme Court, however, determined that federal programs using racial classi-
fications must meet the demands of strict scrutiny to sustain their validity.'68
The Fifth Circuit relied on Adarand, as well as Croson, in dismissing the
diversity rationale. 169  Adarand also is inapplicable to the validity of the
awarded a highway construction project to Mountain Gravel & Construction Company. Id. at 205. In turn,
Mountain Gravel solicited bids from subcontractors to provide the guardrails for the project Id. Adarand
submitted the low bid and Gonzalez Construction Company, a minority-owned business, submitted a higher
bid. Id. Federal law required that the federal agency contract provide the general contractor with additional
compensation if it subcontracted with "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." Id. The
federal law presumed that minorities are economically disadvantaged. Id Despite Adarand's low bid,
Mountain Gravel subcontracted with Gonzales because Adarand was not a minority-owned business. Id.
Adarand claimed that the presumption based on race violated the Fifth Amendment because it denied equal
protection of the laws. Id. at 205-06. The Supreme Court determined that remedial-based racial
classifications by the federal government are subject to strict scrutiny review. Id. at 235.
160. See id. at 205 (discussing award of construction contract to Mountain Gravel).
161. See id. (discussing solicitation of bids for guardrail portion of contract).
162. See id. (describing bids submitted by Gonzales and Adarand).
163. See id. (describing subcontracting provision required by federal law).
164. See id. (describing presumption that Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans,
Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities were socially and economically disadvantaged for purposes
of subcontracting provision).
165. See id. (explaining that Mountain Gravel awarded contract to Gonzales, and not Adarand, only
because Gonzales was minority-owned business).
166. See id. at 205-06 (stating Adarand's claim that presumption in favor of minorities violated equal
protection of laws); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State Shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
167. See id. at 210 (noting that lower courts applied intermediate scrutiny standard to federal racial
classifications).
168. See id. at 213-35 (recognizing that federal race-based actions are subject to same strict scrutiny
as state race-based actions because equal protection under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is
coextensive).
169. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 940-48 (5th Cir. 1996) (observing that post-Bakke
affirmative action cases dismissed diversity rationale).
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diversity rationale because it addressed only a remedial justification in the
context of government contracting. 70 Therefore, a court cannot legitimately
interpret either Croson or Adarand as overruling a university's First
Amendment interest in a diverse student body. Additionally, Adarand never
determined the validity of the asserted governmental interests because the case
merely decided that federal race-based actions were subject to strict scrutiny. '
Hence, Adarand is distinguishable from Bakke in that it did not involve
education - a context that invokes the protection of the First Amendment."
In dismissing the diversity rationale, the Fifth Circuit also relied on
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education. 173 Wygant was a similar case to Bakke
because it presented a race-conscious policy in an educational context. 74 The
Jackson Board of Education amended a provision of its collective bargaining
agreement with its teachers' union. 175 The amended agreement stated that the
school board would implement faculty layoffs in reverse order of seniority.176
However, the amendment added that at no time could the layoffs decrease the
percentage of minority teachers employed by the school district.'" When
nonminority teachers challenged this bargaining agreement, the Jackson Board
of Education asserted that it had designed the race-conscious layoff policy to
remedy past societal discrimination and to provide role models for minority
students.17 8  The Supreme Court struck down the policy because the two
interests served by the policy were unconstitutional. 
79
170. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 205-10 (addressing only remedial use of minority
preference in construction contracts).
171. See id. at 235 (finding race-based actions subject to strict scrutiny).
172. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (recognizing First
Amendment interest in diverse perspectives in classroom).
173. 476 U.S. 267 (1985).
174. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 269-70 (1985) (noting that case involved
collective bargaining agreement between teachers' union and school board). In Wygant, the Supreme Court
considered the validity of a collective bargaining agreement that granted minority teachers preferential
protection from layoffs. Id. at 269-70. Nonminority teachers sued alleging that the school board violated
the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 272. The Court reviewed the issue under strict scrutiny. Id. at 273-74.
This level of analysis required a showing that the racial classification supported a compelling governmental
interest and that the Board chose narrowly tailored means to achieve that goal. Id. at 274. The Board of
Education argued that the purpose of the policy was to remedy prior discrimination by the school district.
Id. at 277. However, the Court concluded that the Board did not narrowly tailor its layoff provision to
achieve the compelling purpose. Id. at 278. The layoff provisions were too broad because they placed "the
entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals." Id. at 283.
175. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270 (describing racial tension as reason for amending agreement with
teachers' union).
176. See id. (describing collective bargaining agreement).
177. See id. (describing collective bargaining agreement's protective provision for minority faculty).
178. See id. at 274-78 (recognizing school board's justification to provide role models for minority
students and to remedy past societal discrimination).
179. See id. at 283.
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Nonetheless, Wygant did not repudiate the diversity rationale because it
addressed only the limits of the remedial justification in an employment
context and did not raise a First Amendment interest of academic freedom. 180
Moreover, three Justices specifically recognized the validity of diversity as a
consideration in fundamental academic decisions.' 8' Although the school
board did not make the diversity argument, Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion referred to the validity of the diversity justification.'82 Furthermore,
in his dissent, Justice Stevens recognized that diversity, as a component of
academic freedom, would have been a possible justification for the school
board's policy. 3
A close examination of post-Bakke affirmative action cases demonstrates
that they have not discredited the diversity rationale. In these cases, the
Supreme Court merely established that an interest in remedying past societal
discrimination was unconstitutional.'84 The post-Bakke decisions did not
abolish a university's compelling interest in a diverse student body because the
cases did not involve this countervailing constitutional right.t85 In Croson and
Adarand, the government could not have asserted the First Amendment as a
countervailing constitutional right because no speech interest was at stake. 6
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor, concurring in Wygant, recognized that the
First Amendment protects a university's exercise of academic freedom to
create a diverse classroom. 17 Consequently, Croson, Adarand, and Wygant
did not affect the First Amendment's protection of race-conscious admissions
policies. 188
180. See id. at 278-79 (invalidating minority-preference layoff policy because policy attempted to
remedy effects of societal discrimination).
181. See id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (recognizing university's interest in diversity
as compelling); id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 315-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same).
182. See id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (noting that "although its precise contours are
uncertain, a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at
least in the context of higher education, to support the use of racial classifications in furthering that
interest").
183. See id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("For one of the most important lessons that the American
public schools teach is that the diverse ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds that have been brought
together in our famous 'melting pot' do not identify essential differences among the human beings that
inhabit our land.").
184. See id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (stating that "a governmental agency's interest
in remedying 'societal' discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be
deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny").
185. See Chen, supra note 44, at 1860 (acknowledging that diversity rationale remains compelling
governmental interest in context of higher education).
186. See Chen, supra note 44, at 1862 (explaining that in non-education affirmative action cases
"government can claim no significant diversity interest").
187. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (recognizing validity of diversity
rationale).
188. See Chen, supra note 44, at 1862 (noting that outside context of education "most other
affirmative action programs have no real connection to diversity of speech and expression").
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C. The Wessmann Decision
In November 1998, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Wessmann v. Gittens8 9 addressed whether Boston's prestigious
examination schools impermissibly considered race in their admissions
policies."9 Pursuant to policy, the Boston Latin School's admissions com-
mittee filled the first half of its available seats on the basis of the applicants'
test scores and grade point averages.' 91 To fill the second half of its available
seats, the committee proportionately admitted applicants on the basis of race. 92
The Boston Latin School denied Sarah Wessmann, a nonminority applicant,
admission as a result of this race-conscious admissions policy.' 93 In defense
of its racial classification, the school committee asserted that it designed its
policy to achieve a diverse student body and to remedy the effects of past
discrimination in the Boston public school system."' The district court
accepted these compelling interests and found that the magnet schools
narrowly tailored their racial classifications to achieve these purposes.195
On appeal, the First Circuit assumed that the consideration of race to
achieve a diverse student body was a compelling state interest. 's Noting that
Hopwood is the only appellate decision to dismiss the diversity rationale,"9 the
189. 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
190. See Wessmaan v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 791-92 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing Boston's three
magnet schools' race-conscious admissions policies). In Wessmari, the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit addressed the constitutional permissibility of Boston's three examination
schools' race-conscious admissions policies. Id. at 792. A school ranked all applicants by a composite
score composed of an applicant's standardized test score and grade point average. Id. at 793. The city filled
the first half of the seats for the examination schools based strictly on this ranking. Id. The city filled the
remaining seats by order of rank; however, the number of students accepted from each specified racial/ethnic
group had to match the proportion of that racial/ethnic group in the remaining qualified applicant pool. Id.
The Boston Latin School passed over Sarah Wessmann, a nonminority applicant, due to this race-conscious
policy. Id. at 793-94. The district court found that the School Committee had asserted compelling interests
in achieving a diverse student body and in remedying the effects of past racial discrimination and that the
policy was narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives. id. at 794. Applying strict scrutiny to the racial
classification, the First Circuit assumed arguendo that Bakke's diversity rationale was still good precedent.
Id. at 796. However, the court of appeals found that the race-conscious policy was intended to achieve racial
balancing, not diversity. Id. at 798. Therefore, the policy failed the Bakke standard of diversity. Id. at 800.
The First Circuit also concluded that the Committee did not show the necessary nexus between the race-
conscious policy and the effects of past discrimination. Id. at 808. Thus, the First Circuit struck down the
admissions policy as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 809.
191. See id. at 793 (explaining admissions policy for Boston examination schools).
192. See id. (explaining race-conscious aspect of admissions policy for Boston examination schools).
193. See id. at 793-94 (explaining reasons for Wessmann's denial of admission).
194. See id. at 792-93 (explaining compelling interests asserted by school committee).
195. See id. at 794 (summarizing findings of district court).
196. See id. at 795 (noting that diversity often is a compelling interest).
197. See id. at 795-96 (noting that Hopwood is only appellate decision finding diversity rationale to
not be compelling).
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First Circuit emphasized that the Hopwood ruling met with substantial dissent
from several of the circuit judges in the Fifth Circuit. 98 Rejecting the Fifth
Circuit's approach, the First Circuit refused to dismiss the diversity rationale
and observed that several Supreme Court Justices have specifically approved
of the diversity rationale in the context of education. 99 Consequently, the First
Circuit analyzed the school's admissions policy under the assumption that the
diversity rationale remained a compelling governmental interest. 2°°
Though the Boston Latin School asserted a diversity interest, the policy
focused exclusively on racial diversity and did not consider the other
characteristics of applicants that would contribute to a student body diverse in
its perspectives."°  Therefore, the court of appeals found that the racial
classification was not designed to achieve a diverse student body but rather to
achieve racial balancing - an unconstitutional purpose.2 2 Because the policy
foreclosed minority and nonminority candidates from direct comparison for all
the available seats, 203 the First Circuit found that the admissions policy was
not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity and thereby was unconstitutional.' °4
Despite this ultimate holding, the First Circuit acknowledged the school's First
Amendment interest in a diverse student body.
205
Hopwood and Wessmann represent a disagreement among the federal
circuit courts of appeals on the validity of the diversity rationale.' The First
Circuit and Judge Wiener accurately recognized that the Hopwood majority
erroneously interpreted Supreme Court decisions on racial classifications in
the employment context. 2°7 The First Circuit correctly assumed that the use of
a racial classification to achieve a diverse student body was a compelling First
Amendment interest of public schools. 28  However, beyond these legal
198. See id. (noting vigorous dissent in Fifth Circuit to denial of rehearing en bane of Hopwood).
199. See id. at 796 (recognizing approval of diversity rationale by individual Justices).
200. See id. (assuming that diversity rationale remained sufficiently compelling to justify racial
classifications in context of education).
201. See id. at 798 (observing that Boston's admissions policy considered only racial and ethnic
diversity).
202. See id. (finding that school intended proportional representation to achieve racial balancing, not
diversity).
203. See id. at 800 (explaining that Boston's admissions policy foreclosed comparison among
applicants for all available seats).
204. See id. (concluding that Boston Latin School's concept of diversity did not meet Bakke standard
of diversity). The First Circuit also found insufficient evidence that the racial classification was necessary
to remedy the effects of past discrimination in Boston's public schools. Id. at 806-07. Mere evidence of
an achievement gap between minorities and non-minorities did not prove vestiges of past discrimination.
Id. at 804-07.
205. See id. at 794.
206. See supra note 98.
207. See Wessrnann, 160 F.3d at 795-96 (recognizing validity of diversity rationale and that Hopwood
represents minority view on issue); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962-65 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J.,
concurring) (arguing that majority was wrong to dismiss diversity rationale).
208. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 796 (assuming that diversity remained compelling state interest).
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rationales, society must embrace the educational benefits that a diverse student
body brings to the classroom.
V. DIVERSITY'S BENEFIT TO THE CLASSROOM
University classrooms play a special role in fostering students'
understanding of racial and societal differences; 209 and diversity within the
classroom is an invaluable tool for introducing students to these varied cultural
values.2"' To fulfill this goal, university classrooms depend upon the
interaction of students with unique perspectives.2 ' To some extent, race
molds the perspectives that students bring to the classroom. 212  Therefore,
through a racially diverse student body, these different life experiences and
viewpoints contribute to the education that universities afford all students.
2 3
As a result, a racially diverse student body counters racial prejudice by
209. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ.. 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950) (finding
that effective education requires exchange of different views between students). In McLaurin, the Supreme
Court addressed a separate-but-equal policy at the University of Oklahoma. Id. at 638. The university
required an African American student to sit at an assigned desk in the classroom, separate table in the
library, and a separate table in the cafeteria. Id. at 640. The Supreme Court found that denying the African
American student interaction with other students hindered his pursuit of an effective education. Id. at 641.
The Court recognized that society's increasing complexity required the classroom to reflect these
complexities. Id. See also Charles R. Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural Society,
8 LA RAZA LJ. 140, 141-47 (1995) (observing that diverse perspectives encourage students to identify with
different elements of society).
210. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457, 472-73 (1982) ("When [a student's]
environment is largely shaped by members of different racial and cultural groups, minority children can
achieve their full measure of success only if they learn to function in - and are fully accepted by - the larger
community. Attending an ethnically diverse school may help accomplish this goal by preparing minority
children 'for citizenship in our pluralistic society."' (quoting Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas
NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 451 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954) ("Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments... [and]
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values."). See also Timothy L Hull, Educational
Diversity: Viewpoints and Proxies, 59 OMo ST. L.J 551, 586 (1998) (noting that diversity in student body
is essential to quality legal education).
211. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 87, at 863 (recognizing that classroom presents rare opportunity
to explore different cultures); Robert N. Davis, Diversity: The Emerging Modern Separate but Equal
Doctrine, I WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L II, 28 (1994) (noting that "students with diverse backgrounds
and interests bring different perspectives to the classroom debate").
212. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 87, at 862 (noting that racial and ethnic diversity affects
individuals' relations with other individuals).
213. See id. (observing that differing relations that occur because of race cause people to possess
different views about society); Okianer Christian Dark, Incorporating Issues of Race, Gender, Class, Sexual
Orientation, and Diversity into Law School Teaching, 32 WILLAMETTE L REv. 541,564-70 (1996) (arguing
that teachers should introduce diversity issues into classroom because many students possess little
experience with these issues).
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fostering exchanges between students of different racial and ethnic
backgrounds in a cooperative learning environment.214
Unfortunately, Hopwood has denied the universities in the Fifth Circuit the
advantages of a diverse classroom.215 Likewise, California's recent prohibition
of the consideration of race in university admissions illustrates the devastating
effects that result from denying universities the academic freedom to compose
racially diverse student bodies. California's prohibition" 6 has dramatically
decreased the number of minority students in California's public
universities. 2 7  For example, the freshman minority enrollment at the
University of California at Berkley dropped by half due to the discontinuance
of race-conscious admissions policies.2 18 Similarly, universities in the Fifth
Circuit lack the benefits that racial diversity brings to the classroom.2 9
Despite the decisions made in California and the Fifth Circuit, a university's
narrow consideration of race to achieve diversity in the classroom remains
constitutional as an exercise of a First Amendment interest in academic
freedom.
214. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 473 (1982) (recognizing that racially
diverse classrooms may help to "teach[ ] members of the racial majority 'to live in harmony and mutual
respect' with children of minority heritage" (quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 485
n.5 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)); see also Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes:
Social Science Evidence, 59 01uO ST. L.J. 733,748 (1998) (finding positive effects from universities' efforts
to encourage multiculturalism in classroom).
215. See Shepard, Colleges Ponder Criteria for Merit, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, June 7,1998, at
A37 (reporting 5% fewer minorities in 1998 freshman class at University of Texas than in pre-Hopwood
1996 freshman class); Hopwood Decision a Time-Warp to Pre-Affirmative Action Days, Some Say, DALLAS
MORNING NEws, July 7, 1997, at A7 (noting fear that Fifth Circuit's ruling would "leave the University of
Texas Law School with its smallest minority enrollment since 1970s").
216. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (a) (1999) (prohibiting consideration of race in public university and
college admission decisions).
217. See Shepard, supra note 216, at A37 (noting that 1998 freshman class at California's most
selective universities had far fewer minorities than before adoption of constitutional amendment prohibiting
consideration of race in admissions decisions). In 1997, the University of California at Berldey had 21.9%
non-Asian minority freshman students. Id. However, in 1998, the Berkley campus had only 10.5% non-
Asian minority freshman. Id. In 1997, the University of California at Los Angeles enrolled 21.8% minority
students in its freshman class. Id. In 1998, the number of minority students enrolled as freshman at UCLA
dropped to only 14.1%. Id.
218. See id. (noting that after Proposition 209 Berkley campus' minority enrollment dropped by half).
219. See Jonathan R. Alger, Unfinished Homeworkfor Universities: Making the Casefor Affirmative
Action, 54 WASH. U.J. URa. & CONTEMP. L 73, 80 (1998) ("[D]iversity in the classroom is the most
effective of all weapons in challenging stereotypical preconceptions."). See also Rodney Ellis, Outlook,
Tide of Academic Apartheid Threatens Texas' Future, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 28, 1998. at 17 (noting that
minority enrollment at Texas universities had dropped since Hopwood). Texas State Senator Rodney Ellis
observed that, since the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood ruling, "[e]nrollment by African-American freshman at
the University of Texas at Austin has fallen 14 percent, while at Texas A&M it has crashed by 23 percent;
Hispanic enrollment at UT and A&M fell 13 percent and 15 percent respectively." Id. Even more
astonishing, Ellis found that at the Univeristy of Texas School of Law, the number of African-American
students dropped 87 percent and Hispanic enrollment dropped by 46 percent Id.
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VI. BAKKE'S DIVERSITY RATIONALE PASSES STRICT SCRUTINY
In Bakke, Justice Powell recognized that racial classifications inherently
conflict with the Equal Protection Clause22 because these classifications treat
citizens differently on the basis of race.22' Therefore, courts review racial
classifications under strict scrutiny to determine the permissibility of an
incidental infringement on equal protection rights.222 This standard consists
of two components.223  First, the government must assert that the racial
classification serves a compelling governmental interest - a diverse student
body. 21 Second, the means chosen_ the racial classification _ must be
narrowly tailored to that compelling interest.22
A. Diversity Is a Compelling Governmental Interest
The narrowly tailored consideration of an applicant's race to achieve a
diverse student body is constitutional despite an incidental infringement on
another applicant's equal protection rights.2 26  Over the years, diversity has
emerged as one of the few justifications for a racial classification that has
survived strict scrutiny analysis.227 Despite the diversity rationale's incidental
infringement on equal protection rights,22 8 the Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies because of the First
Amendment interest in academic freedom. 29
Moreover, the Supreme Court has never repudiated the diversity
rationale.23' In fact, very few Supreme Court cases have addressed diversity
220. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State Shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.").
221. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that racial
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny review because such classifications inherently implicate equal
protection issues).
222. See id. (finding that race, as suspect classification, is always subject to strict scrutiny).
223. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 235 (discussing strict scrutiny standard).
224. See id. (noting first prong of strict scrutiny standard).
225. See id. at 238-38 (discussing second prong of strict scrutiny standard).
226. See Chen, supra note 44, at 1855 (noting that case law recognizes diversity as viable rationale
for racial classifications).
227. See id. at 1860 (acknowledging that "[tihe legitimacy of diversity as a governmental objective
remains one of the few fixed points in the Supreme Court's shifting case law on affirmative action").
228. See id. at 1861 (noting tension between Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment under
diversity rationale).
229. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978) (Powell, J.) (finding race-
conscious admissions policies constitutional, as long as narrowly tailored to achieve diversity).
230. See Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that
no Supreme Court decision suggests that diversity is not compelling state interest).
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as a justification for racial classifications.23' The post-Bakke cases, such as
Croson, Adarand, and Wygant, involving racial classifications have primarily
concerned the employment context" and have not implicated the First
Amendment right to academic freedom.233 Bakke is the only instance in which
the Supreme Court has addressed the diversity rationale within the context of
higher education. 234  In that case, Justice Powell was the only Justice to
analyze the constitutionality of a race-conscious admissions policy under strict
scrutiny. 235 In so doing, he found a university's First Amendment interest in
diversity compelling.2 36 To date, Justice Powell's opinion remains the clearest
statement from the Supreme Court on the validity of the diversity rationale. 7
B. Consideration of Race as a "Plus" Factor Is Narrowly Tailored to
Achieve a Diverse Student Body
In addition to the identification of a compelling governmental interest,
strict scrutiny requires that the government narrowly tailor its means to
achieve that interest. 238  In Bakke, Justice Powell recognized that any
consideration of race was suspect and that the element of race-consciousness
in an admissions policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve the governmental
objective of a diverse student body. 239 Justice Powell endorsed the Harvard
Plan as an example of a narrowly tailored admissions policy because it
considered a wide variety of factors to achieve a diverse student body.'
Because the composition of a diverse student body depends on more than
race alone, the university's admissions policy must consider the sundry
characteristics that students bring to the academy.24 In other words, every
231. See Chen, supra note 44, at 1860 (observing that following Bakke, "the Supreme Court decided
at least thirteen affirmative action cases, excluding voting rights cases. No more than three... presented
a colorable interest in diversity").
232. See id. at 1862-63 (recognizing that racial classification cases before Supreme Court arise in
employment discrimination context, not in realm of education).
233. See id. (noting that "the bulk of the Court's affirmative action docket has focused on 'the work
of the manual laborer"' and not on education).
234. See id. at 1863 ("Only once has the Court examined affirmative action in a university setting
(Bakke).").
235. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
236. See id. at 312-14 (finding interest in diverse student body compelling).
237. See McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 938 F. Supp. 1001, 1014-15 (D. Mass. 1996) (finding
that Justice Powell's opinion recognizing validity of diversity rationale was strongest Supreme Court
statement on issue).
238. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (finding strict scrutiny review
necessary for all racial classifications).
239. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-18 (Powell, J.) (discussing "plus" factor consideration of race as
narrowly tailored).
240. See id. at 316-18 (Powell, J.) (describing Harvard Plan as example of narrowly tailored
consideration of race).
241. See id. at 317-18 (Powell, J.) (discussing consideration of characteristics other than race).
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applicant possesses numerous characteristics that an admissions committee
may consider in developing a genuinely diverse student body. 2 One such
characteristic is an applicant's race.1 3 A narrowly tailored race-conscious
admissions policy must compare all applicants with all other applicants for all
of the available seats.2" Under such a comparative policy, the consideration
of race as a "plus" factor is narrowly tailored because that approach does not
focus solely on race.245 Therefore, the limited consideration of race in a
university's admissions policy is constitutional.
VII. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment protects a university's narrow consideration of an
applicant's race to achieve a diverse student body.' Some commentators
have heralded Bakke as the salvation of affirmative action. 7 Others have
decried it as the death of equal protection.24 Regardless of these opinions,
Bakke reaffirmed a public university's First Amendment right to compose a
diverse student body within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment.
249
Since 1978, the vast majority of courts have recognized this relationship
between the First and Fourteenth Amendments as binding precedent. 250 Future
courts should continue to respect the Bakke decision, not only as precedent, but
because the diversity of America's classrooms is essential to the future of the
nation.
251
242. See id. at 318-20 (Powell, J.) (discussing need to consider all relevant factors of all applicants).
243. See id. at 311-15 (Powell, J.) (finding race to be legitimate consideration to achieve diverse
student body).
244. See id. at 316-20 (Powell, J.) (finding narrowly tailored admissions policy considers all
applicants for all available seats).
245. See id. at 319-20 (Powell. J.) (stating that narrowly tailored admissions policies only consider
race as "plus" factor).
246. See id. (Powell, J.) (recognizing narrowly tailored race-conscious admissions policies as
constitutional).
247. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 87, at 857-59 (discussing virtues of race-conscious admissions
policies and Bakke's diversity justification).
248. See Chen, supra note 44, at 1867-80 (arguing that diversity justification brings more problems
than solutions).
249. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(discussing selection of student body as aspect of academic freedom).
250. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 795-96 (1st. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that Hopwood is
in minority on issue of whether diversity is compelling governmental interest).
251. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N.H., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("he Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth out of a multitude of tongues.").

